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The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral 
Energy Cooperation among Western  
Industrialized Countries 
Henning Türk ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ölkrise von 1973 als Herausforderung für die multilaterale 
Energiekooperation westlicher Industrieländer«. Much of the existing historical 
research discusses the 1973 oil crisis through single national perspectives. In 
contrast, this article focuses on the multilateral dimension of this far-reaching 
event. Starting with the Suez crisis of 1956, it explores the work of the OECD 
Oil Committee and its High Level Group regarding possible oil crises. However, 
the crisis mechanisms the OECD developed were not activated when the 1973 
oil crisis hit. Thus, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took the initiative to 
form a stronger group of oil consuming countries outside the OECD, which 
should have guaranteed cohesion in the West in future oil crises. Pressured by 
the United States and expecting advantages from close transatlantic energy 
cooperation, the other Western industrialized countries, except France, ap-
proved of the project. The result was the founding of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in November 1974. Its structure and voting rules reflect the cru-
cial role the United States play in the agency. Therefore, in the context of in-
ternational relations, the IEA serves as an example of the United States’ strug-
gle to maintain its hegemony in the Western camp. 
Keywords: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
oil, consumer cooperation, Henry Kissinger, Washington Energy Conference, 
Energy Coordinating Group, International Energy Agency, intergovernmental 
organizations. 
1.  Introduction1 
In existing historical research, the oil crisis of 1973 has been analyzed primari-
ly from national perspectives. Researchers have focused mainly on the 
measures that national governments implemented to deal with the oil shortage, 
consequently giving the impression that single countries reacted to the oil crisis 
                                                             
∗  Henning Türk, Institute for History, Faculty for Humanities, University Duisburg-Essen, 
45117 Essen, Germany; henning.tuerk@uni-due.de.  
1  I would like to thank Wilfried Loth, Frank Bösch, and Rüdiger Graf for critical comments on 
the first drafts of this article. 
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in an uncoordinated way.2 That a forum for multilateral cooperation in energy 
policy among Western industrialized countries had existed before the oil crisis 
– i.e., the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – 
is disregarded. Within this forum, the Oil Committee and its specialized small-
er group, the High Level Group of Oil, discussed the future development of oil 
supplies and how to react to current and future energy crises. 
During the oil crisis, the potential for improving cooperation in energy poli-
cy between oil consuming countries was specifically articulated at the Wash-
ington Energy Conference initiated by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
which took place February 11-13, 1974 and involved ministers from the most 
important industrialized nations. The conference established the Energy Coor-
dinating Group (ECG), which, in the following months and under US supervi-
sion, devised a program for energy policy cooperation among Western indus-
trialized countries. In addition, the ECG worked on a coordinated Western 
approach to the economic reaction to the oil crisis – it was not simply a ques-
tion of ensuring oil supplies in the case of a future oil embargo, but it was also 
important to ascertain the economic consequences of the oil crisis and to deter-
mine how the Western world would cope with it. In these economic and political 
analyses, the ECG made particular use of the expertise of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the OECD. The energy policy solutions then developed into 
the International Energy Program, which was to be implemented by a new inter-
national organization, the International Energy Agency (IEA), which was found-
ed in November 1974 and placed under the umbrella of the OECD in Paris. The 
IEA therefore replaced the OECD as the central multilateral coordinating organi-
zation of Western industrialized countries in the field of energy. 
In the following, this transition from the OECD to the IEA will be scruti-
nized, with an emphasis on the creation of a united reaction to the oil supply 
crises among Western industrialized countries. One major question is why the 
countries did not revert back to the OECD directly after the 1973 oil crisis and 
extend its responsibilities. How much experience had these countries gained in 
the various OECD energy bodies in the build-up to the oil crisis and to what 
extent did this experience affect the organization of future cooperation in the 
IEA? What did the Western industrialized countries expect from future cooper-
ation in the IEA? Thus, I aim to extend beyond the dominant national narra-
tives of the oil crisis by presenting the perspective of international cooperation. 
Based on this, I will present in the conclusion deliberations on how interna-
tional cooperation changed in the 1970s. Many scholars in global history, such 
as the historian Akira Iriye, see this decade as decisive for the formation of a 
“global community” of governmental and non-governmental organizations. 
                                                             
2  See e.g. Merrill 2007; Hohensee 1996. Graf 2014 presents a more comprehensive approach. 
He interprets the oil crisis as a challenge to the sovereignty of the oil-consuming countries 
and analyzes multilateral cooperation in this context. 
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The number of intergovernmental organizations grew from 280 to 1530 be-
tween 1972 and 1984.3 But did this quantitative increase also represent an 
increase in quality?4 In this context, the foundation of the IEA can provide us 
with important answers. 
This article is based on previously unreleased documents from the OECD 
archives, as well as on relevant volumes from the Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS), the Documents on British Policy Overseas (DPBO) and 
the Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD).5 
In addition, I have used archival material from Ulf Lantzke, the OECD Coun-
sellor on Energy Questions and later the Executive Director of the IEA, as well 
as from the West German Foreign and Economics Ministries. 
2.  The OECD and the Decline of the American Oil Shield 
(1956-1973) 
Multilateral cooperation in energy policy had already begun with the OECD’s 
predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
which was originally established to allocate Marshall Aid funding.6 As early as 
May 1948, a month after its founding, the OEEC created its Oil Committee in 
order to distribute American aid with the intent to increase European refining 
capacity. In addition, the committee administered statistics for the demand for 
crude oil and its by-products. As the OEEC extended its responsibilities to 
cover the analysis and evaluation of West European economic development, 
the importance of the Oil Committee grew, especially since crude oil was cov-
ering an ever-larger proportion of Europe’s energy needs. During the Suez 
Crisis of 1956, agreements between the Oil Committee and the United States’ 
Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) compensated the fall in oil sup-
plies which was caused by the closing of the Suez Canal. In this context, the 
close cooperation with the oil industry organized by the OEEC Petroleum 
Emergency Group, which had in the meantime joined the Oil Committee, 
played a significant role. The work of the Oil Committee was made difficult, 
however, as the delegations had to frequently consult with their own govern-
ments when making decisions. Despite these difficulties, the hope of benefit-
                                                             
3  See Iriye 2004, 129. 
4  In this respect, the originator of the regime theory, Robert Keohane, analyzed the IEA. 
However, he did not consider the experience of the OECD. See Keohane 1984, esp. 217-40. 
5  Foreign Policy Records of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
6  Regarding the history of the OEEC/OECD, which has until recently been neglected, see 
Griffiths 1997; Wolfe 2008. 
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ting from surplus US oil production was a particular motivation for maintaining 
cooperation.7 
Energy policy also remained an important topic when, in 1961, the OEEC 
was transformed from a European organization to the transatlantic OECD, with 
the addition of the United States and Canada. In the Oil Committee and its 
High Level Group, the member countries’ energy officers discussed measures 
to compensate for future shortages.8 At the same time, they developed projec-
tions for future energy demand and available sources of oil. To assess crisis 
preparation measures, the OECD developed a detailed questionnaire, which 
was regularly sent out to member countries and enabled the OECD to analyze 
to what extent member countries were prepared for potential oil shortages.9 
These measures were planned for only Western European OECD members, 
however; because of their dependency on imported crude oil, they were par-
ticularly susceptible to supply crises. In case of an emergency, the United 
States, with its significant oil production capacity, served as a last resort for 
Western Europe. 
The United States’ protective function proved to be particularly helpful in 
the events of the Six Day War of 1967.10 For the first time, the Arab states had 
employed the embargo concept to have a broad impact, affecting 80 percent of 
West European oil imports; but the embargo could only be maintained for a 
short period. This was mostly due to the US government’s quick reaction, 
permitting the use of US oil reserves and coordinating with the oil industry to 
supply oil to their European allies. The oil embargo was also a test case for the 
OECD’s measures for dealing with a crisis, which were based on Western 
Europe’s ability to build up strategic oil reserves. In addition, an emergency 
decision reactivated the Industrial Committee (formerly the Petroleum Emer-
gency Group), which continued to work closely with the MEEC. However, the 
Oil Committee’s discussions were proceeding in a less-than-satisfactory way 
for the United States. In the OECD, some European countries, such as France 
or West Germany, did not feel the need to declare an emergency. There was 
fear of provoking the Arab countries to extend the embargo.11 The committee 
ultimately decided to announce emergency under pressure of the American 
OECD envoy, who declared that the supporting measures could only be intro-
                                                             
7  OECD Oil Section, Report on OECD-Wide Apportionment of Oil Supplies in an Emergency, 
Document DIE/E/PE/73.126, Paris, 19 November 1973, OECD Archive, High Level Group Oil: 
DIE/E/PE. On the Suez crisis as an energy crisis, see Chakarova 2013, 39-52. 
8  Graf 2014, 52-66. 
9  Chakarova 2013, 43-50; Graf 2014, 56; Graf 2010, 334. 
10  On this subject and the following section, see Chakarova 2013, 97-102; Graf 2014, 58f. For 
a British perspective see Thorpe 2007. 
11  For West Germany’s criticism, see “Bundesminister Schiller, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswär-
tige Amt, 20.6.1967” In Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (A-
APD) 1967, doc. 228, 936-8. 
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duced, when the Europeans would officially declare they were in a crisis. 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Turkey abstained from the vote. 
Cooperation between the United States and industry allowed the OECD to 
quickly deal with the consequences of the short embargo. 
Afterwards, however, the possibility of using US oil reserves in times of cri-
sis diminished as, by the end of the 1960s, the character of the oil market had 
changed rapidly.12 In the 1950s and 1960s, oil companies controlled the market 
– from drilling to sales to the end consumer. As of the end of the 1960s, the oil 
countries had been improving their market position by nationalizing part of the 
oil industry, participating stronger in the profits of the Western oil companies, 
and demanding higher prices. The increasing economic dependence of the 
West on oil had made this possible. Oil consumption increased enormously in 
not only Japan and Western Europe, but also the United States, which had 
nearly hit its limit on oil production. As a consequence, the reserve capacity, 
which had been adequate for the shortfalls in 1956 and 1967, was now no long-
er available. The further increase in US oil consumption also meant that the 
country itself was becoming a major buyer on the international oil market, 
which, in turn, increased pressure on the market. 
Alarm bells started to ring within many European countries when, on Janu-
ary 8, 1970, the United States delegate in the Oil Committee declared that other 
countries could no longer rely on his country’s supplies in future energy cri-
ses.13 In the following months, the United States delegates urged the other 
members to build up higher oil reserves.14 As a result, the OECD Council de-
manded that European member countries keep a 90-day reserve to be used in 
the event of a crisis,15 and the Oil Committee regularly checked on member 
countries’ efforts to achieve the reserves. 
At the same time, the Oil Committee was occupied with a more detailed 
emergency plan for the Western European countries. The negotiations resulted 
in the OECD Council’s passing of the Oil Apportionment Decision, which laid 
out specific crises measures.16 The decision required governments to devise 
emergency plans to reduce oil consumption in individual countries in the event 
of a crisis. The OECD Council also determined that a unanimous decision was 
needed to implement the emergency plans as defined by the Oil Committee. 
                                                             
12  On this subject and the following section, see Yergin 1991, 688-711. 
13  Graf 2014, 59f. 
14  “Telegram from the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment to the Department of State.” In Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969-
1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 146-8. 
15  This was the decision C(71)113(Final). See Scott 1994, 36. 
16  On this decision C(72)201(Final) and the following section, see Scott 1994, 35-6; Lantzke 
1976, 218-9; OECD Oil Section, Report on OECD-Wide Apportionment of Oil Supplies in an 
Emergency, Document DIE/E/PE/73.135, Paris, 28 November 1973, OECD Archive, High Level 
Group Oil: DIE/E/PE, 4-5. 
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The main features of the oil distribution system were fixed and based on mem-
ber states’ previous oil consumption. Ten percent of the oil available was to be 
reserved for special emergencies. An International Industry Advisory Board 
was once again set up to advise the Oil Committee on measures to be taken 
during crises and to provide information on the amount of oil available. 
Concentrating these measures on West Europe proved to be increasingly 
anachronistic. The OECD had expanded into the Pacific region, with Japan and 
Australia joining, and had thus evolved from a transatlantic into a trilateral 
organization. This development was to be reflected in the crisis procedure, 
since Japan imported all of its oil and was therefore particularly vulnerable in 
an energy crisis. 
The geographic expansion of the OECD and the increasing deterioration of 
consuming countries’ negotiating positions quickly led to the consideration of 
comprehensive reforms in cooperation amongst oil consuming countries. By 
May 1972, there was already speculation within the US government about a 
transatlantic “energy community.”17 On May 30th, the Undersecretary of State 
John Irwin suggested to the OECD Council of Ministers that the High Level 
Group should develop a program for a consumer group 
to increase the availability of all types of energy resources, to lessen, to the 
degree possible, an overdependence on oil from the Middle East, to coordinate 
the response of consuming countries to restrictions on the supply of Middle 
East petroleum, and to develop, jointly and cooperatively, a responsible pro-
gram of action to meet the possibility of critical energy shortages by the end 
of this decade.18 
The Dutch wanted to go even further. In an Oil Committee meeting on June 19, 
1972, they proposed using the strategic oil reserves to improve the oil compa-
nies’ negotiating position vis-à-vis the oil producers. This suggestion was re-
jected, however, because the countries that had no domestic oil companies did 
not expect any resulting advantage.19 
With the US government’s stronger commitment to consumer cooperation, 
it was now prepared to discuss a common emergency sharing policy for the 
OECD. In October 1972, the Oil Committee decided that the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and Japan should jointly devise new conditions for an emer-
gency system, which would apply to all OECD countries.20 However, the four 
delegations did not succeed in working out a new system. 
                                                             
17  “Memorandum of Conversation, May 22, 1972.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 296. 
18  Ibid., 296, fn. 4. 
19  “Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, June 27, 1972.” In 
FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 300-301; “Airgram of the Department of State to the 
Embassies in all OECD Capitals, July 21, 1972.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 313-6. 
20  On this subject and the following section: OECD Oil Section, Report on OECD-Wide Appor-
tionment of Oil Supplies in an Emergency, Document DIE/E/PE/73.135, Paris, 28th November 
1973, OECD Archive, High Level Group Oil: DIE/E/PE, 4-5. 
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The failed negotiations were evaluated in the meetings of the Oil Committee 
and its High Level Group on June 12, 1973. The US government had come 
well prepared to both groups’ meetings. The US State Department considered it 
essential to work towards a common OECD approach to the oil market. In 
particular, officials wanted to avoid a race to obtain oil reserves between con-
suming countries, as this would push up prices. For the State Department, the 
meetings were the right place to discuss increasing cooperation between the 
consumer nations,21 the potential for which rested in three areas: in the emer-
gency sharing and oil stock policy, in research and development, and in the 
creation of a consumer organization that countered OPEC. According to the 
State Department, its energy situation and its leading role in research gave the 
United States a central position, and it could make full use of this position in 
bargaining. The High Level Group therefore decided in its meeting to form a 
new informal working group, which now included European participants, in 
order to work out the emergency procedures together.22 
The group’s work suffered, however, because the United States, Japan, and 
European countries wanted to calculate the potential loss of oil differently. The 
United States wanted the sharing system calculated on the basis of imported 
oil, whereas the Japanese and Europeans wanted to bring the total reduction in 
oil consumption into the equation.23 The American proposal was obviously in 
its own favor. They would be at an advantage if an embargo were to be directed 
at them, because their strong domestic production would remain outside the 
equation. In long and difficult negotiations, the working group agreed that in 
the final report the various options would be compared and the political deci-
sion would be left to the higher-ranking boards. The final report contained not 
only an overview of the different calculating methods of oil sharing, but also 
the different ways of declaring emergencies, ranging from a unanimous vote to 
an automatic triggering when an agreed threshold of oil loss would be reached. 
The report also made clear that oil sharing was only one of a range of efforts 
the consuming countries could make to survive a future crisis scenario and 
reduce their dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The rationing of oil consump-
tion, the creation of further oil reserve supplies, aligned research and develop-
ment, and energy conservation were all of great importance. However, it was 
                                                             
21  “Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs (Armstrong) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Casey), April 20, 
1973.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 455-61. 
22  FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 492, fn. 9. 
23  “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Casey) to Acting 
Secretary of State Rush, September 19, 1973.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 561-2. 
Cf. Painter 2013, 180. 
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also obvious that cooperation in all of these areas would be possible only if an 
agreement on a common sharing system could be reached.24 
As a result of the complicated negotiations and contentious discussions, the 
report could not be presented before November 1973, when the oil crisis was 
already one month old. In the meantime, the OAPEC had already started the 
embargo against the United States, the Netherlands, and Portugal and had de-
cided to gradually reduce output. At the same time, OPEC had increased the 
posted price for crude oil considerably. 
At the meeting of the High Level Group on October 25, 1973, it had already 
become clear how difficult it was to activate the existing emergency procedure, 
even in this acute crisis. The American delegation had expected the crisis pro-
cedure would be triggered and the Industry Advisory Board would be activated. 
In the discussion, however, the British, French, and West German delegations 
were against the activation. The arguments resembled the OECD discussions 
that occurred during the 1967 embargo – for example, there was once again the 
desire to not provoke the Arabs and cause panic in Britain, France, and Germa-
ny. Instead, the Western European countries suggested an informal cooperation 
with the oil companies. The US delegation pointed out that problems would 
probably ensue with the American Anti-Trust Law, as it did in 1967, since this 
allowed oil companies to only exchange information in an emergency. At the 
end of the day, there was no decision, and the OECD left oil rationing to the 
companies. 
The US delegation regarded the European approach as proof of the success of 
an Arab oil policy. The clever breakdown of consumer countries into preferential 
and non-preferential categories seemed to be effective. France and Britain, in 
particular, tried to maintain their preferential status, fearing disadvantages should 
they increase cooperation with the Israel-friendly United States.25 
From the United States’ point of view, the OECD, which the country was re-
lying upon for its plans to expand consumer cooperation, had thus proved to be 
ineffectual in the endurance test. The US government now reconsidered its 
approach to multilateral energy policies. 
                                                             
24  OECD Oil Section, Report on OECD-Wide Apportionment of Oil Supplies in an Emergency, 
Document DIE/E/PE/73.135, Paris, 28 November 1973, OECD Archive, High Level Group Oil: 
DIE/E/PE. 
25  “Cable about Meeting of High-Level Group of OECD Oil Committee from OECD (Paris) to 
Department of State, October 26, 1973.” <http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973 
OECDP27835_b.html>. Regarding the British point of view, see also “Minute: Carrington to 
Heath, London, 22 October 1973.” In Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), Series 
III, vol. IV. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, doc. 320. In the research it has always been empha-
sized that it was the French who had prevented the activation of the crisis procedure. See 
e.g. Chakarova 2013, 67. 
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3.  Henry Kissinger‘s Leadership and the Sidestepping of 
the OECD 
The OECD’s performance in the oil crisis cast much doubt within the US ad-
ministration about the suitability of this organization for the development of 
cooperation amongst consumer nations. Additionally, Henry Kissinger’s in-
creasing influence on US foreign energy policy led to a downgrading of the 
OECD’s role in the US energy policy approach. In his roles as the national 
security advisor under President Richard Nixon and, from September 1973 
onwards, as Secretary of State, Kissinger identified US crude oil policy as a 
key foreign policy issue. His point of view was much influenced by the energy 
and economics expert Walter J. Levy, who also advised the British government 
and a number of oil companies.26 In a Foreign Affairs article, Levy had de-
scribed the OECD as an unsuitable body for maintaining cooperation between 
consumers. While it had helped maintain an information exchange and provid-
ed important analytical data, the power shift within the oil market rendered the 
OECD too weak to stand up to the oil-producing countries. Thus, a new and 
more powerful consumer organization was needed.27 In a conversation with 
Kissinger, Levy dismissed the OECD as merely a “talk group.”28 In addition, 
he recommended pushing the increasingly intransigent French out of the circle 
of cooperating consumers.29 
For Kissinger, a consumer group led by the United States would not only 
back the US power vis-à-vis OPEC but could also be used as a means to reach 
other foreign policy aims. In particular, he saw a way of binding Western Eu-
ropean countries and Japan closer to the United States, as these countries be-
came ever more self-confident in foreign policy. The United States’ strong role 
regarding energy issues, which Kissinger wanted to take advantage of, could 
not be exploited in the OECD. Due to the unanimity rule, any country, regard-
less of its size or power, could veto a decision. The question was therefore how 
to find new forms of cooperation, whereby the United States could make better 
use of its political strength. 
For this reason, the US Secretary of State presented a far-reaching sugges-
tion to the public. In a speech to the Pilgrim’s Society in London on December 
12, 1973, Kissinger proposed the creation of an Energy Action Group, com-
prised of the most important Western oil-consuming countries. This group of 
high-ranking personalities was to develop a consumer cooperation program. 
                                                             
26  Regarding Levy’s consulting activities for the British government, see Kuiken 2013, 269-307. 
27  Levy 1973, 181-90. 
28  “Memorandum of Conversation, November 26, 1973.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 
699. 
29  Ibid., 700. 
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According to Kissinger, the aim of this program was to secure the supply of 
energy at reasonable prices. For example, it was to coordinate energy-saving 
measures and joint research. In concluding, Kissinger appealed to Western 
partner countries to deal with the challenge in the spirit of cooperation, even 
comparing this challenge to the “Sputnik shock” of 1957.30 
A few days later, US representatives made it clear to the OECD’s Oil Com-
mittee that this Energy Action Group was to be organized in a trilateral and 
effective way. Its core should consist of one high-ranking representative per 
geographical region: North America, Western Europe, and Japan.31 According 
to the US government the OECD was definitely not suitable for this purpose – 
the political differences within the OECD were too great. The High Level 
Group could, at most, assist the newly formed group.32 
The European countries saw this differently. They attempted to position 
Kissinger’s suggestion within the OECD. At the meeting of the heads of the 
European Community (EC) in Copenhagen on December 14 and 15, 1973, 
these countries announced that they were prepared to examine in more detail 
the subject of consumer cooperation in an OECD study group.33 A few days 
later, government officials in the OECD Oil Committee, including the United 
States, discussed Kissinger’s proposals. They tasked OECD General Secretary 
Emile van Lennep with coming up with suggestions for how to organize the 
Energy Action Group, based on Kissinger’s speech.34 
Kissinger, however, remained at the helm and did not let the initiative be 
taken from him. By making his speech, Kissinger had already moved the issue 
of consumer cooperation from the OECD to a more noticeable level: the minis-
terial level. Thus far, only insiders were privy to discussions on multi-lateral 
energy policy; now such discussions were being made known to the public at 
large. In this way, Kissinger had made it clear to the public and his Western 
partners how important cooperation was to him. He was thus exercising public 
pressure on Western governments to resist the power of OPEC. He was also 
displaying to OPEC members that the United States was not willing to stand 
back passively and watch power shift within international relations. In order to 
discuss his proposal in greater detail and to examine new mechanisms for mul-
                                                             
30  “Rede des amerikanischen Außenministers, Henry Kissinger, vor der Pilgrims Society in 
London am 12. Dezember 1973 über die transatlantischen Beziehungen (gekürzt).” In Euro-
pa-Archiv 1974, Dokumente, 45-50. 
31  Here there is a connection with the work of the Trilateral Commission. Part network and 
part think tank, the Trilateral Commission also discussed the idea of closer cooperation on 
matters of energy between North America, Western Europe, and Japan. 
32  “Tel 1533 to UKREP Brussels, 13 December 1973, doc. 456”; “UKDEL OECD tel 109, 17 De-
cember 1973, doc. 469”; “UKDEL OECD tel 118, 19 December 1973, doc. 476”; all in DBPO, 
Series III, vol. IV. 2006. 
33  Scott 1994, 44. 
34  “UKDEL OECD tel 118, 19 December 1973, doc. 476.” In DBPO, Series III, vol. IV. 2006. 
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tilateral cooperation, Kissinger and President Nixon disseminated an invitation 
to the Energy Conference, which was to take place February 11-13, 1974 in 
Washington, DC. 
4.  The Dominance of the US Position in the Washington 
Energy Conference in February 1974 
The reactions of Western countries to Kissinger’s proposals and Nixon’s invita-
tion were rather tepid. Japan and the Western European countries, except 
France, acknowledged a closer cooperation with the United States, but this 
topic had now attracted too much public attention, which was not particularly 
useful for cautiousness in extending consumer cooperation. The OPEC coun-
tries observed the preparation for the conference carefully and warned against 
the forming of an organization opposing them.35 Western Europe and Japan 
could not afford such a confrontation in light of their strong dependence on 
Middle Eastern oil and pointed out on many occasions that the United States 
had to avoid creating the impression that an anti-OPEC front was being 
formed. The United States therefore officially announced that no confrontation 
was planned but, internally, Kissinger made it clear that the conference was 
“designed to create a united front.”36 He further explained to his staff, 
I mean we will say all the appropriate platitudes about this not being a con-
frontation with producers. The fact of the matter is that the only way the con-
sumers can protect themselves against what is a revolution in international fi-
nance, in international economics, is to share a common perception and to 
organize it. 
The fact that the other countries had lower aims at the conference became clear 
in the EC Foreign Ministers’ conference mandate from February 5, 1974. They 
stressed the conference delegates could not make any significant decisions 
regarding international cooperation in energy policy, because only the Western 
consuming countries would meet in Washington. Therefore, the conference 
should not be allowed to become a permanent arrangement nor represent a new 
framework for international cooperation. Instead, the conference could only 
examine how to rejuvenate the already established cooperation in the OECD 
and the IMF and whether a world conference of oil consumers and producers 
should be organized. Moreover, it could verify whether it was worthwhile to set 
                                                             
35  See e.g. Permanent Delegation of the EC-Commission at the OECD to the EC-Commission 
concerning the meeting of the High Level Group Oil/Visit of Mr. Yamani and Beleid in Tokyo, 
Paris, 1.2.1974, Historical Archives of the EU, Florence, Papers of Emile Noel, EN 0456. 
36  “Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting.” In FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 2011, 
doc. 293, 821-6, here 822-3. Cf. Graf 2014, 294. 
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up working groups to cover special topics.37 Therefore, on the whole, Kissinger’s 
proposals were treated cautiously. The UK government even warned the US 
administration directly that its expectations for the conference were too high and 
recommended the United States adopt a less offensive conference tactic.38 
Kissinger disregarded these warnings. To push through his ambitious aims, 
he applied pressure in the lead up to the conference. He repeatedly mentioned 
in conversations with European and Japanese Ministers that the United States 
would enter bilateral negotiations with oil-producing countries should the con-
ference fail, which would considerably weaken the other consuming countries’ 
negotiating position. Kissinger threatened the Europeans with strengthening US 
isolationism should they not align with US aims.39 This was particularly alarm-
ing for West Germany, which relied on a US security guarantee. 
At the conference, the other countries tried to hand over the planned cooper-
ation work to the various existing boards, such as the OECD.40 Kissinger dis-
missed this idea completely. He had already insisted to the West German am-
bassador Berndt von Staden that he did not believe the OECD to be the 
appropriate body for dealing with consumer cooperation. Energy issues were, 
in his view, primarily a political problem and only partially a technical one.41 
Since the US government did not budge on its position at the conference 
and, in conversation and speeches, their representatives had been hinting at the 
dangerous consequences should the conference fail, more and more countries 
aligned with the United States, thus going beyond the EC mandate. The only 
exception was France, represented by Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who 
ended up refusing to sign the most important part of the conference communi-
qué, which covered consumer cooperation.42 It was then agreed that a group of 
high-ranking officials from among the conference delegates should come to-
gether to analyze the various consequences of the oil crisis. Among other 
                                                             
37  The conference mandate of the EC Council of Ministers can be found in AAPD 1974, 196-
197, fn. 4 and in: “Telex 691 UKREP Brussels, 5.2.1974.” In DBPO, Series III, vol. IV, 2006, doc. 
535. The council members were very satisfied with a commission’s draft of the council man-
date, which was based on a strict French paper and a more conciliatory German summary of 
the discussions in the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER). For an ac-
count of the council discussions, see: “Telex 690 UKREP Brussels, 5.2.1974.” In: Ibid., doc. 
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in Historical Archives of the EU, Florence, Papers of Emile Noel, EN 0456. 
38  “Telex 269 to Washington, 3.2.1974.” In DBPO, Series III, vol. IV. 2006, doc. 531. 
39  See e.g., “Gespräch des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem amerikanischen Außenminister 
Kissinger in Washington, 10.2.1974.” In AAPD 1974, doc. 42, 166-70. 
40  Conference participants were the nine EC countries and the USA, Canada, Norway, and 
Japan, as well as the President of the EC Commission François-Xavier Ortoli and the OECD 
General Secretary Emile van Lennep. 
41  “Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt, 5.1.1974.” In AAPD 1974, 
doc. 5, 16. 
42  Regarding the French position, see Hiepel 2012, 292-301; Gfeller 2011, 120-33; Tauer 2012, 
131-41. 
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things, the group was to find out how multilateral cooperation could be orga-
nized in the following areas: 
(a) the conservation of energy and restraint of demand; 
(b) a system of allocating oil supplies in times of emergency and severe shortages; 
(c) the acceleration of development of additional energy sources so as to diversify 
energy supplies; 
(d) the acceleration of energy research and development programmes through in-
ternational cooperative efforts.43 
At the end of the day, cooperation with the United States in these areas was so 
important that most of the EC countries were prepared to accept a deterioration 
of their common work in the EC, caused by the controversy with France.44 In 
his internal evaluation of the conference, Kissinger made it clear that the sepa-
ration of the EC countries was intended. Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the 
conference taught the Europeans a lesson.45 Kissinger crowed that now the 
Europeans knew “who’s got muscle.”46 Whether this “power play” between the 
United States and the EC would have consequences for further cooperation 
would become evident in the negotiations that followed. 
5.  The Energy Coordinating Group and the United States’ 
Push for a New International Organization 
The negotiations of the group of civil servants that made up the so-called Ener-
gy Coordinating Group (ECG) got off to a quick start. Kissinger wanted to 
exploit the United States’ dominance and the Europeans’ weakened role. He 
forced the negotiations on the hesitant Europeans, who had considered taking a 
break after the difficult conference, in order to reflect upon its consequences for 
intra-European and transatlantic relationships.47 
                                                             
43  “Final Communiqué of the Washington Conference (13 February 1974).” <http://www.cvce.eu 
/obj/final_communique_of_the_washington_conference_13_February_1974-en-96e19fad-
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44  “Telex 574 from Washington, 13.2.1974.” In DBPO, Series III, vol. IV, doc. 549. 
45  “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and President 
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Organizationally, the Americans now made concessions to the Europeans. 
They offered the chair of the ECG to the Belgians, and thus, after the first 
meeting in Washington on February 25, the remaining negotiations were 
moved to Brussels. 
Regarding content, it quickly became clear that the groups involved had dif-
ferent ideas about one central task of the ECG: the preparation of a conference 
with the oil-producing countries. This part of the conference communiqué had 
been a decisive concession the United States made to the other participants. By 
placing closer consumer cooperation in the context of a future consumer-
producer conference, they wanted to signal to OPEC that they were not out for 
confrontation. For this reason, the Europeans, and particularly the British, 
wanted to quickly organize a consumer-producer meeting, but the US repre-
sentatives put on the brakes. They wanted the ECG to work out a common 
position for the consumer countries first and then turn to the oil-producing 
countries as a group. But this was exactly the kind of confrontation the Europe-
ans and Japanese had wanted to avoid. 
When it became possible to establish contact with the oil-producing coun-
tries at a special session of the UN General Assembly about raw materials and 
development, which had been going on since April 9th in New York, the ECG 
agreed to not approach the producing countries as one unified group, but to 
sound these countries out on a bilateral basis.48 The ECG then evaluated the 
results of the bilateral talks. Most delegations expressed disappointment at the 
reactions. It was apparent that the oil-producing countries had no interest in a 
dialogue with the consuming countries about the oil issue alone. They saw the 
whole energy problem as the main leverage to push through the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, which was to replace the old system that benefitted 
only the industrialized countries, and to take into account the needs of develop-
ing countries.49 The ECG members therefore agreed to publicly support the aim 
of maintaining a dialogue with the producing states, but were conscious of the 
fact that this would not be happening in the near future.50 Thereafter, the matter 
of a consumer-producer dialogue, which had been a central point of the ECG 
agenda, faded into the background.51 This result was convenient for the United 
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HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  223 
States, as it was then possible to develop an initial unified stance for the con-
sumer countries. 
In this respect, the US government’s main aims were to decide on crisis 
measures and develop joint efforts to bring down the price of oil. In a declara-
tion to the ECG, the leader of the US delegation, Under Secretary of State for 
International Security Affairs William H. Donaldson, had made clear what was 
important to the United States: as a result of successful negotiations, the partic-
ipating countries “must be considered a single unit in energy matters. Any cut-
off or discriminatory pricing on energy exports to any one country must be 
considered a cut-off to all.”52 
When the US government presented its concrete proposal on June 12, 1974, 
it laid bait for the other countries, persuading them to accept it. By now, the 
United States was ready to go back to the proposal it previously had rejected in 
OECD committee meetings in November 1973. This new proposal essentially 
laid out a scheme for consumer cooperation that the OECD working group had 
already identified in those November 1973 meetings. For example, measures 
were aimed at reducing the amount of oil consumed during a crisis, increasing 
the emergency crude oil reserves, and carrying out joint attempts to develop 
alternative energy sources. But now, the US government accepted that, in a 
crisis, its oil production would become part of a distribution system. In addi-
tion, the United States was proposing the founding of a small international 
organization to carry out the program, which would entail an administrative 
board of foreign and energy ministers, a committee of high-ranking civil serv-
ants for crisis management, and a secretariat for day-to-day operations.53 
The other countries could hardly turn down the United States’ offer. Con-
tent-wise they were in full agreement with its ideas. Denmark and Italy in par-
ticular also demanded stricter control of the market through the consumer 
group and by regulating prices. These interventionist tendencies were inter-
cepted by the US government, which did not want to endanger the oil compa-
nies’ traditional role. US representatives made sure that the consuming coun-
tries did not work against, but rather in cooperation with oil companies.54 
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A proposal to make the market more transparent, which was promoted by 
the Federal Republic of Germany, found widespread approval.55 The govern-
ments’ traumatic experience of making decisions without reliable data in the oil 
crisis made the proposal plausible. It was therefore decided in the negotiations 
to set up an information system based primarily on the regular supply of data 
from the member countries. Consequently, they had to establish national in-
formation systems in cooperation with the oil companies. This new multilateral 
data collection system countered the mistrust towards oil companies – a notice-
able sentiment among a number of governments during the oil crisis. As such, 
the oil crisis caused governments to take a different view of the industry’s role 
in the oil market. Efforts made here went far beyond the rudimentary statistical 
work of the Oil Committee and its High Level Group.56 
While the countries came to quick agreement on content, most continued to 
reject the creation of a new organization to carry out the proposal’s aims. The 
Europeans were particularly keen to utilize the OECD, because the agreed-
upon program then appeared less confrontational. In addition, the EC enjoyed 
special status in the OECD, which meant the EC Commission could be includ-
ed in the new energy policy measures. The EC countries also wanted to assure 
consistency with the developing EC energy policy.57 Even France, which still 
remained on the fringes, showed signs of rapprochement should the new pro-
gram be transferred to the OECD.58 Since the United States still insisted on its 
own independent organization, the compromise was to establish the new organ-
ization as a separate body – with its own rules – within the OECD. By doing 
so, the United States wanted to prevent any country from vetoing a decision. 
The fragmentation of Western industrialized countries, as exemplified by the 
OECD bodies during the oil crisis, had underscored that a unanimous voting 
procedure was not particularly helpful in organizing resistance to OPEC’s 
threats. Besides, decisions had to be made quickly in the case of a crisis, and 
such a procedure seemed to be too time-consuming. 
The United States was able to push through the system of weighing votes 
according to oil consumption on most of the topics, a ruling that was clearly in 
its favor, as compared to the unanimous system used by the OECD. The new 
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voting system also made sure that neither the US nor Western Europe as a bloc 
could push through decisions alone.59 
Additionally, the OECD debates during the 1967 and 1973 oil crises had re-
vealed that the process of voting on when to set off the crisis procedure was not 
constructive. They had only underlined the lack of unity among Western indus-
trialized countries. Within the ECG, there was agreement that the decision to 
activate the crisis system was to be depoliticized – in other words, it would be 
triggered automatically. As such, the ECG negotiators reverted back to an 
option that had already been discussed by the OECD Oil Committee in No-
vember 1973. The secretariat of the new organization would declare the crisis 
situation and, therefore, obtained an authoritative position. The threshold for a 
crisis was fixed at a seven percent drop in either one country’s or the whole 
group’s oil supplies.60 
After the details were agreed upon, they were laid out in the Agreement on 
an International Energy Program, which established the IEA as the administra-
tive body for these measures. The last hurdle rested on the OECD council’s 
decision. Unanimous approval was needed to establish the IEA as an autono-
mous organization within the OECD. However, some delegates were indeci-
sive, including the French. A few days before the vote, Kissinger proposed a 
financial safety net of 25 billion dollars within the OECD for countries particu-
larly affected by the oil crisis. US Secretary of Finance William E. Simon made 
clear that the fund should support only countries that participated in the joint 
efforts to reduce dependency on Middle Eastern oil. The proposal’s link with the 
vote was not directly mentioned, but was obvious.61 Accordingly, France, Ice-
land, and Greece abstained from voting on November 15, 1974, a move that was 
formally possible without endangering the agreement.62 Along with the United 
States, the founding members of the IEA were: Canada, Great Britain, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, 
Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, and Turkey. 
The members expected the IEA to prevent the potential future use of the “oil 
weapon,” universally reduce dependency on Middle Eastern oil, and provide 
reliable data for political decisions. It was the first time the United States was 
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formally part of the common sharing system, which the other members per-
ceived as a decisive step toward securing their oil supplies.63 In his final as-
sessment of the IEA, Kissinger articulated the United States’ broader approach, 
pointing out that the oil crisis “dangerously strained political, security, and 
economic ties within the industrialized world. The IEP was […] designed to 
avoid such costs in the future.”64 
6.  Conclusion 
This analysis began with the recognition that, even before the oil crisis, cooper-
ation among the Western industrialized nations on energy policy in the OECD 
was evident. This was particularly the case when it came to crisis measures in 
Europe and energy consumption projections. During the oil crises caused by 
the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six Day War in 1967, supply problems were 
countered by making use of the US oil reserve capacity, whereby the OECD’s 
Oil Committee acted as a kind of coordinating body. But this arrangement 
became outdated in light of rising US oil consumption. The United States urged 
the Europeans to therefore intensify measures to deal with crisis situations, 
particularly by building up strategic oil reserves. 
The concentration on Europe was increasingly perceived as inappropriate. 
Consequently, the Oil Committee and its High Level Group analyzed perspec-
tives on consumer cooperation that included the United States, Canada, and 
Japan. They identified a joint sharing system as key for cooperation in the case 
of crisis. Agreement was not found, however, since the countries that were 
extremely dependent on imported oil requested the inclusion of US oil produc-
tion in this system, and, in 1973, the US government was not yet prepared to 
carry this responsibility. 
Therefore, all Western countries entered the oil crisis of 1973 insufficiently 
prepared. The uncertainty of the situation made clear the shortcomings of the 
measures already planned, especially since the Arab countries cleverly divided 
the Western consumer countries into preferential and non-preferential coun-
tries. The OECD thus failed to bring about a unanimous decision on activating 
the crisis procedure. 
In this context, US Secretary of State Kissinger identified that a strong con-
sumer group would be a useful means of opposing OPEC/OAPEC power and 
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absorbing centrifugal tendencies in the Western camp. As such, energy policy 
served as a vehicle for the United States to maintain its leading role among 
Western industrialized countries. Therefore, Kissinger started an initiative to 
build closer cooperation among the consuming countries, culminating in the 
Washington Energy Conference in February 1974. 
By applying political pressure, the US government was able to encourage 
the participating countries, with the exception of France, to set up the ECG, 
which was supposed to sort out the possibilities for consumer cooperation. In 
the ECG discussions, the US government showed its willingness to include the 
US oil production in the sharing system, because this concession was now part 
of the State Department’s foreign policy strategy. In this way, the United States 
succeeded in obtaining an agreement on a consumer cooperation program. 
The previous OECD negotiations convinced the US government in particu-
lar that a unanimous decision-making system was not beneficial for its aims, 
and the ECG therefore decided to weight the vote in the IEA on the basis of oil 
consumption. In this way, the United States exercised greater influence on the 
IEA than it did on the OECD. Additionally, the triggering of the crisis case was 
depoliticized. The IEA’s secretariat had to declare the crisis after a minimum 
drop in oil supplies of 7%. The ECG discussions about the tasks and the struc-
ture of the IEA therefore took on the previous discussions and papers produced 
by the OECD Oil Committee and its High Level Group. The OECD thus 
proved in the event of the 1973 oil crisis to be more of a think tank than a deci-
sion-making center. 
The negotiations in the OECD and the ECG made clear that the United 
States was the leading power in the initiative to generate cooperation among 
Western oil-consuming countries. To most countries, the idea that consuming 
countries should cooperate seemed necessary. However, such an initiative 
seemed too daring for Europeans and Japanese, who feared direct consequenc-
es regarding oil supplies. It became clear that the initiative’s success or failure 
depended on the degree of US commitment. The inclusion of US oil supplies in 
the sharing system was the major concession here. The prospect of this security 
in future oil crises finally convinced the other countries to favor strong cooper-
ation with the United States. For this reason, the United States’ relative domi-
nance was tolerated. 
This article shows it is necessary to also look from an historical perspective 
at the questions of how international relations changed in the 1970s and how 
power shifting went hand in hand with these changes. Following the final phase 
of the Second World War, when, for example, the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and, later, the GATT cemented the United States’ institutionalized dominance, 
the 1970s seemed to be a second development and transitional phase for inter-
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national organizations.65 This period was shaped by major challenges for West-
ern industrialized countries. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the 
oil crises, the EC’s pursuit of a more independent role in international relations, 
and the rising power of some Third World countries challenged the dominant 
paradigm of international relations under US leadership. The negotiations lead-
ing to the establishment of the IEA can, therefore, be seen as a struggle of the 
United States to maintain its hegemonic role. By promising more energy secu-
rity, the United States succeeded in rallying around them the Western industri-
alized countries, with the exception of France, and in restoring its hegemony, at 
least in energy cooperation. Thus, the main tasks of the IEA became not only 
managing a crisis procedure and making information about the oil market 
available to its members, but also coordinating the Western approach to inter-
national energy politics under US leadership. In this respect, the IEA served as 
a tool to prepare a common Western approach for the Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris between 1975 and 1977, at which 
the Western industrialized countries discussed energy matters with oil produc-
ing countries. Since the end of the 1970s, the IEA also proved helpful in devel-
oping the papers for the energy discussions of the G6 and G7 summits. Still 
today, a coherent IEA approach on energy matters is secured by the limitation 
of membership to only OECD countries.66 
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